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Summary  
 
 
This paper creates a mathematical model in which the banks are faced with two optimization 
problems. The first optimization problem is how to optimize their behavior in order to 
maximize profits. The second optimization is how to optimize the structure of liabilities in 
order to have minimum regulation. The regulatory regime is imposed by the central bank. 
This paper investigates the behavior of banks when faced with high regulation and provides a 
theoretical framework for analysis of the impact of high regulation on the choice of the bank’s 
portfolio structure. The model shows the banks have a learning framework in which the banks 
learn the central bank’s true model and adjust their credit policies to existing regulatory 
regime. However this adjustment also creates changes in the choice of credit.  
 
 
 
JEL Classification: E58, C61, C73, E51 
Key Words: credit, central bank regulation, dynamic programming, Bayesian learning 
 
Neven Vidaković 
Effectus University College for Finance and Law 
Kennedy Square 2 
10000 Zagreb 
Croatia 
nvidakovic@vsfp.eu 
 
 
 2 
1. Introduction 
 
Banks have always been an interesting research subject. The main reason for this interest are 
bank’s inherent ties to the business cycles and the fact the banks are the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. Banks are interrelated with the monetary policy and are the 
ones that actually transfer the effects of monetary policy on to other economic participants, 
the households and the firms. The object of this paper is to look at how does monetary policy 
and choice of regulatory regime affect the distribution of credit towards three main bank’s 
clients: households, firms, government
1
. 
This paper will proceed to model the banks as profit maximizing economic individuals that 
are faced with dynamic constraints imposed by the central bank. The banks are trying to 
optimize their behavior under uncertainty. The uncertainty in this paper will come from 
frequent and erratic changes of regulation imposed by the central bank. The regulation 
imposed by the central bank can be relatively large as a percentage of the bank’s balance 
sheet. The variation in regulation therefore changes the size of the bank’s funds available for 
lending and depending on the regulation the banks has to adjust their behavior. For the 
purpose of our model the behavior of banks is in fact: credit policy.  
For the purposes of this paper we will considers regulation just on bank’s assets. The scope 
and the size of the regulation are dictated by the structure of the bank’s liabilities. In small 
open economies like Croatia the structure of liabilities can be separated between the currency 
structure (local currency, foreign currency) and origin of the funds (resident or nonresident 
funding). 
The banks have a similar optimization problem like households. While households try to 
maximize the utility, which comes from consumption, the banks are faced with optimization 
on two fronts. The first optimization is the optimization of sector distribution of loans with the 
purpose to maximize profits. This optimization is focused to which sector in the economy to 
give loans to: corporate, households or government. In terms of the balance sheet this could 
be termed the optimization of the assets. The second optimization problem for banks comes 
from regulation imposed by the central bank and how to create the liabilities structure in order 
to have as little as possible regulatory burden. In terms of the balance sheet this could be 
termed the optimization of the liabilities. But when it comes to the optimization of the 
liabilities the banks are in inferior position since they cannot manipulate the monetary policy 
decisions that central bank is undertaking. The regulation is imposed on them by the central 
bank. In this case the banks are faced with the Stackelberg problem.  
All of the above elements, taken into consideration, present interesting modeling challenge of 
the banks and their behavior. The strategic choices in dynamic setting combined with the 
Stackelberg problem of the interplay with the central bank in a small open economy is the 
objective of research for this paper. The paper proceeds as follows. Part two of the paper 
gives a brief overview of the major problems in banking history in Croatia, part three creates 
a model in which the banks optimize their income. Part four gives a model in which the banks 
optimize their behavior in respect to the central bank. Part five concludes.  
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2. Brief history of banks in Croatia  
 
Banking industry in Croatia met many challenges. These challenges can be separated into 
internal and external ones.  
The externals ones are the interest rate risk and the fact that over 90% of the Croatian banking 
sector in foreign owned
2
. So there is possibility of external crises to be spilled over onto 
Croatian banks like it was the case with the start of the crisis in 2009. However this is of a 
minor concern due to high capitalization and high liquidity of the banking sector. Although 
the banking sector in Croatia is highly developed and is over 110% of GDP, the Croatian 
banks are relatively small in comparison to their mothers companies. The best example of the 
relative small size of the Croatian banking sector and the overall lack of importance is the fact 
that there was not a single problem with a bank in Croatia due to the problem with mother 
company.  
The internal challenges are two fold, the first problem is the legacy of the past and the second 
problem is the regulation imposed by the central bank. According to Ribnikar (1999, 1999, 
2004) the fact the companies did not have strictly determined capital, but what Ribnikar calls 
"sort of capital" was one of the main source of the propagating inflation in Yugoslavia. The 
banks were "forced" give loans as needed by the companies, regardless of the credit risk. At 
the same time for retail customers it was hard to obtain loans. Because of this the banking 
sector in Yugoslavia was not entirely stable by today’s standards. The purpose of banks was 
to facilitate the real sector of the economy and not to take heed of the capital and profit 
standards. As for the retail clients the households were allowed to save in foreign currency, 
but there was no abundance of retail credit.  
Legacy of the past is again two fold. The first element is political and the second one is 
economical. Croatia was part of Yugoslavia, a socialist closed economy whose banking 
system depended on domestic funding and domestic sources of money. In Yugoslavia the 
growth of the bank's balance sheet came from households, which had unusually higher rate of 
savings and business which were owned by the people
3
 as presented in Rohatinski et all. 
(1995). 
The households were perceived as economic elements that produced savings and firms the 
economic elements that used savings funds obtained by the banks. This circle of taking 
household's savings and lending it to companies was the basis of the socialist economies, 
although this economic structure was more related to the basic capitalism. It was Keynes who 
postulated that S=I in a closed economy, this doctrine was enforced by the socialist system 
where banks served as a financial service for companies. However the credit risk restrictions 
were not heavily enforced at the time which caused banks to be the least profitable sector of 
the economy.  
After the dissolution of Yugoslavia the banks were privatized one by one, some of them 
collapsed under the heavy burden of bad loans and the new banks were formed. In Croatia 
there were two large banking crises. The first crises were caused by the collapse of the 
Dubrovačka banka and the second one was caused by the collapse of Riječka banka. It is 
generally considers Dubrovačka banka collapsed because of the political pressure to give bad 
loans with doubtful collateral, while Riječka banka collapsed because of the lack of proper 
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supervision and illegal dealings of Head trader. Banking crisis and the process of privatization 
were explained in Kraft (2002) and Kraft, Faulend, Tepus, (1998). 
The failure of banks, need to patch up budgetary deficits and moral hazard problem has led 
Government owned Privatization fund to privatize banks in Croatia. Most banks in Croatia 
were privatized by 2000 mostly to large foreign conglomerates. Today only two banks are 
still owned by the government; Hrvatska poštanska banka and Croatia Banka which have 
around 7% of market share together. The number of banks in Croatia is also decreasing, from 
all time high number of 60 in 1998. to 27 at the end of 2014. 
Banks in Croatia also have to contend with the legacy of hyperinflation. In the period from 
1992 to 1994 Croatia experienced period of spiraling hyperinflation which reached at one 
point level of 25% per month. Then in late 1994 a stabilization program was undertaken. The 
effect of the stabilization program was sudden stop in inflation which stabilized the economy 
and made possible economic restructuring described in Rohatinski et all (1995).  
This turbulent banking past brings us to the second internal challenge the banks face in 
Croatia: high levels of regulation. The lack of supervision and political pressure led the 
regulator to be very strict with the banks. Large balance sheet burdens were imposed on the 
banks through the regulation.  
The main regulations are the reserve requirement on domestic and foreign funds (currently 
12%), minimal foreign currency short term loans (for liabilities received in foreign currency 
and foreign currency claims the bank had to maintain at least 17% in strictly determined 
assets which may not have maturity larger than 3 months). For the overview of the current 
regulation the best source is the Central bank bulletin and for the evolution of the regulation 
there is a great description in Galac (2010)
4
.  
However the theoretical level of the percentage of liabilities that are subject to regulation is 
from 0% (capital and funds received from other banks in Croatia are not subject to regulation) 
to 25%. However in the time periods where there was a special regulation on funding 
obtained from nonresidents the percentage of funds blocked could go as high as 72% of 
incoming liabilities. Large differences in the amount of possible regulation on funds received, 
ranging from 0 to 72% of the funds received, makes governance of the regulation inside of the 
bank's balance sheet of major importance for any bank in Croatia
5
. The regulation presented 
here refers just to the regulation which affects the structure of the balance sheet. As presented 
in the overview from Galac (2010) there is also regulation limiting the growth to retail and 
corporate clients to 12% per year imposed in 2007 and continued in 2008. These changes in 
the regulation are precisely the object of investigation of this paper and how have changes in 
the regulation affected bank’s credit policy choices.  
 
3. Dynamic model  
 
In this part of the paper we are going to create a dynamic model of bank’s balance sheet. But 
before we move to explicit mathematical model we have to create some theoretical 
foundations. First issue is the issue of risk per unit of credit. Here we have two options. The 
first option is to have absolute risk exposure. In this case the bank is always willing to risk a 
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fixed monetary value per unit of credit. The second option is to have a relative risk exposure 
where bank is always willing to risk x % per unit of exposure. The first option is not realistic 
since it is not possible for a bank to risk 100 monetary units per both credit in the mount of 
1000 and 1000000 monetary units. Because of this we will use relative risk exposure. This is 
much more realistic with the respect of the banking business.  
The importance of determining the risk exposure lies in the modelling approach in this paper. 
It is standard practice in economics for households to be modeled as utility maximizing 
participants in the economy. We are going to use the same approach with the banks. We are 
going to present them as utility maximizing agents with constant relative risk aversion.  
Using the business logic of the previous two paragraphs we are going to set up the utility 
function for a representative bank. As noted the difference between the bank and a household 
is that the households try to maximize consumption and the banks try to maximize profits. So 
instead of c for consumption in utility functions for banks we are going to have π for profits. 
However we should note that the profit is an accounting variable, not economic variable. The 
formula for profit can be shown as:  
 
1. LrA    
 
Where π is profit, A are assets and L are liabilities6 r is the average interest rate on assets and 
δ is the average interest rate on liabilities. Since by the accounting equality assets have to 
equal liabilities we get the following equation for banks profits.  
 
2. ArAArA   )(         
 
Where τ is the net interest rate the bank gets or the interest rate spread between the assets and 
liabilities. In this paper we are using profits, although we could be using A , the results are the 
same. We now turn back to the form of the utility function.  
In this model we are going to assume that the banks are using CRRA style function as it was 
explained in the previous section. The utility function we are going to use as the control 
function for our optimal control problem.  
Now we are going to set up the optimal control problem the banks are facing. The problem 
will be stochastic since the banks have uncertainty in their business and have to create 
expectation about future. Basic set up of the problem can be also found in Cooper and Adda 
(2003) and initially developed by Bellman (1957). The optimization problem for the banks is 
how to maximize present value of expected profits over time.  
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Where x is the part of the bank's balance sheet that is interest bearing and is net of regulation 
imposed by the central bank. The rest of the balance sheet is tied up with regulation and it will 
be optimized in the next section. We are assuming that x has some initial value of the bank’s 
balance sheet, this is the bank's balance sheet where when the bank starts the control problem, 
the end value is free. We are also assuming that through time the value of x is greater than 0, 
since it would be impossible for the bank to have no interest bearing assets. 
The transition equation for interest bearing part of the balance sheet is:  
 
5. )(1 tttt cyxx     
 
In each period the bank has net interest bearing assets xt-1 from the previous period and the 
current period changes in the values of interest bearing assets. Where yt represents the 
incoming funds into the bank, ct are the outgoing funds in each time period.  
The assets in the bank are earning some interest. The bank has two choices of investing. The 
first choice is to invest in the risk free government bonds that have return r or to lend at some 
rate z, but with risk
7
. The balance sheet is split into parts that are invested with risk and the 
parts that are invested without risk.  
 
6.        tttttttt zrcyxx    111*)(1       
with 0≤ω≤1 
 
In equation (6) z is the rate of return on risk bearing asset, r is the interest rate obtained by 
investing in risk bearing assets. Both rates of return are net rates of return. The portion of the 
balance sheet invested into risk bearing asset is ω.  
To obtain the recursive solution to the bank’s optimization problem we will use Bellman 
principle of optimality as described in Adda and Cooper (2003). Now we can set up the 
bellman equation 
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Equation (7) is subject to equations (5) and (6). 
The E in bellman equation indicates expectations. Equation (7) is telling how the bank is 
going to behave. By solving the bellman equation we can find the optimal path for the bank in 
order to achieve the maximization of profits. First order conditions are: for π 
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equation (8) and the envelope theorem described in Blanchard and Fisher (1989) we can get:  
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Now we can conclude that marginal utility of profit has to be equal to the marginal increase in 
x, the interest bearing part of the balance sheet. Using this relationship we can eliminating 
V'(x+1) from the first order conditions and get equations in (9) and (10).  
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We can now substitute (11) into (10) and get:  
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In this we have solved the problem of bank’s optimization of business part of the balance 
sheet. Bank is trying to optimize profits and therefore it will try to find the optimal 
distribution of risk and risk free assets in its balance sheet. We will not move to the analysis 
of the relationship between the central bank and bank. 
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4. Banks vs. Central bank  
 
In the previous part we have looked at the general solution to the optimal behavior of a bank 
in economic setting where the bank has to optimize the balance sheet in order to maximize 
profit. In the previous part we have only looked at the business part of the balance sheet, 
which we have called the interest bearing part of the balance sheet. In this part we are going to 
look at the behavior of banks in relationship with the central bank. The relationship of a bank 
with the central bank is in fact the problem of the optimization of the bank’s balance sheet 
due to regulation.  
The banks are under direct supervision of the central bank and have to obey the rules imposed 
by the central bank. In terms of game theory this set up puts banks directly in inferior position 
to central bank. The banks have to obey a large set of rules and regulation. The specific 
regulation we are going to analyze is the regulation which impacts the ability of the bank to 
perform its business activities. This is the regulation which forces bank to exclude some funds 
out of the lending process (like reserve requirement); limits banks decision on credit 
distribution per sector
8
, or limit the growth of loans
9
.  
The restrictions imposed on the banks are done through regulation which specifically states a 
certain portion of assets has to be invested in a certain way. Usually this is determined 
through the structure of liabilities. The most common and the most practiced regulation of this 
kind is the reserve requirement. The reserve requirement requests a portion of funds received 
from certain liabilities has to be deposited with the central bank, or some other institution. 
The exact specification of the reserve requirement can vary over many parameters: term, 
currency, source, and residency. Apart from the reserve requirement the banks might also be 
regulated with strict ratios imposing certain structure on the bank’s balance sheet.  
The regulation is usually used by the central bank with some very specific design in mind. 
The complexity of regulation automatically increases the complexity of the optimization 
problem for the bank. The smaller the amount of regulation, the less complex is the bank’s 
optimization with respect to the central bank.  
The scope of the possible regulation is very broad. If the regulation is large and complex it is 
very important for banks to optimize the total impact of the regulation, both on the bank’s 
balance sheet and on the bank’s profits. Another problem for the banks is the fact the 
regulation might change over time and the bank also has to make expectations over the future 
how the regulation will look like and what will be the impact of the regulation. The possibility 
of changes in regulation and instability of regulation increases complexity of the optimization 
problem for the banks.  
What we will specifically pay attention to is going to be the impact of the regulation on 
business choices made by the banks and how does the choice of the monetary regime impact 
the behavior of banks. Since the central bank has power to impose regulation when it sees 
new regulation necessary the banks are in fact faced with Stackelberg problem where they 
have to optimize not just their internal behavior, but also the shocks made by the behavior of 
the central bank.  
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Since banks in their essence are intermediaries between those who have funds and those who 
need funds the structure of balance sheet regulation
10
 is exceptionally important. First thing 
about regulation is that the regulation dictates the interest rates and therefore the cost of 
funding in the economy. The amount of regulation imposes the minimum interest rate on 
assets placed based on the interest rate of liabilities
11
: higher the regulation, higher the interest 
rate. The banks do not create regulation; they just try to optimize the existing regulation so the 
banks can maximize their profits. This is an important point, because it implies the banks 
will dance to the tune of the central bank, not the other way around. The banks adjust to 
the regulation through a dynamic process.  
The basic premise developed here lies on the theoretical assumption the bank is playing a 
game with the central bank. The object of the bank is to have the maximum benefit from the 
regulation, or stated differently the bank is trying to minimize the “damage” to the income 
caused by the regulation. Since the central bank imposes the regulation, forces banks to obey 
the regulation, the banks are forced to play along. So we have two players, one which is 
imposing the rules and the second one which is forced to play by the rules.  
The model we are going to present here relies on Hansen and Sargent (2005).We shall denote 
the total balance sheet, regulation plus business part with vector A, let At
S
 denote the history 
from t so s. If the subscript is omitted we take it to be 0. If the super script is omitted we take 
it to be  . The balance sheet will have two components, two vectors with different 
investments in them. The first vector is noted to be the endogenous vector x (bank chooses 
what to do with the loans placed as described in the previous part) and the exogenous vector q 
(the central bank imposes the regulation). The endogenous one is the component that is under 
director control of the bank, while the exogenous one is a component not under direct control 
of the central bank. Using the vector notation these two components can be presented as:  
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The exogenous part of the assets shall have the transition law,  
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Where ε is identical and independently distributed changes in the regulation with a 
distribution Φ, this distribution is unknown to the bank and the bank can only made 
assumptions about it, but it is known to the central bank since the central bank is in charge of 
the regulation. 
The shocks ε in fact are the changes in the regulation. The only way a bank can know in 
advance what there will be the change in regulation is if the central bank explicitly states 
when and to what extent the regulation is going to be changed. So the natural question arises: 
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how does the bank obtain expectations about the future regulation changes? In order to 
answer this we have to use the Bayesian learning approach.  
One of the main characteristics of the Bayesian approach is the fact that the prior distribution 
can be updated at any point in time. Using this property we can expect the bank to have the 
ability to learn the behavior of the central bank. Any time a change in the regulation occurs 
the bank can update the prior distribution used in order to determine the future changes in the 
regulation. With this tool the banks have a powerful learning mechanism which allows them 
to adopt their expectations and change their forecasts of regulation over time.  
Naturally the more levels of regulation (term structure, source, currency) more expectations 
will have to be created and the probability distribution of expectations is going to be greater, 
which implies a larger margin of error for the banks. So the more regulation there is the more 
stochastic elements the banks are faced with.  
We have set up the interest bearing part of the balance sheet and we have set up the regulatory 
part of the balance sheet. Now we have to ask: how does total structure of loans A evolve 
over time? In order to develop transition equation we have to understand the process. By 
definition assets equal liabilities. In order to place assets the bank has to obtain liabilities. 
There are three main sources of funding for any bank. The primary source of funding which is 
funding received from clients; the funding which comes to the bank. The bank does not go out 
and try to obtain it. The secondary sources of funding are funds received from financial 
institutions or specific investors; the bank has obtained them by actively pursuing funding. 
This is the funding the bank has obtained through borrowing from someone else. The third 
source of funding, which is also a part of the secondary sources is the capital. In this 
particular case the owners of the banks or new investors are willing to give funding to the 
bank in exchange for the part of the ownership of the bank.  
The funds enter into the balance sheet and are in terms of accounting booked in liabilities. In 
assets the funds get separated into two parts. The first part is part we have noted as q and it is 
the part needed for regulation. The second part is the part used for business activities and that 
part has been noted as x. We can show changes in the size of the balance sheet 
mathematically as: 
 
17. 






















 














11
1
1
11
11
*0
111
tt
tt
tt
t
t
t
dC
SS
PP
sp
sp
q
x
A
tt
tt


 
 
The equation (17) has the following notation: A are assets; P are primary sources of funds 
(superscript y denotes incoming and c denotes outgoing funds); S are secondary sources of 
funds (superscript y denotes incoming and c denotes outgoing funds); C is capital; p is 
regulation requirement on primary sources of funds, has value 0≤p≤1; s is regulatory 
requirement on secondary source of funds 0≤s≤1 and d are dividends paid.  
As we can see from the equation (17) the funds enter or exit and so does the structure of the 
balance sheet between the regulatory part and the free part change. Also we have not made 
any specifications on the regulation, except for the fact that there is no regulation on the 
capital. No regulation on capital is also assumption since the bank can impose reserve 
requirement on subordinated debt, which is a part of the capital. As for the values of p and s 
they have been bounded between 0 and 1. With 0 meaning there is no regulation and 1 
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meaning that the whole amount of funds received from the source has to go towards the 
regulation.  
Now that we have set up the transition equation we can see that the problem the bank is facing 
is to minimize the size of q in the balance sheet. That is to minimize the amount of funds used 
for regulation in the balance sheet.  
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Where θ is the discount factor with values 0<θ<1 and E denoted expectations. So the bank 
wants to minimize the size of the regulation in the bank’s balance sheet.  
Since we are dealing with a complex environment we are going to make some changes in the 
model. First of all we are going to reformulate the problem. We are not going to analyze the 
balance sheet values at all, what we are going to analyze is the percentages of the regulation 
and interest bearing assets in the balance sheet, this implies that x+q=1. We are also going to 
assume that at any point in time there is some optimal distribution of interest bearing assets x* 
and regulation q* which will give the bank the most profit given the current regulation. The 
bank wants to be as close to that optimal distribution at any point in time.  
The bank does not know what the central bank is planning to do with the regulation in the 
future. So the bank has to assume what the central bank is going to do. Over time the bank has 
the ability to learn what the central bank is doing. This model is universal for any regulatory 
regime and has nothing to do with the choice of the monetary policy. The central bank can 
control the banks regardless of the choice of the regulatory regime.  
As one bank can take the regulation and calculate the optimal balance between the x and q in 
the balance sheet, so can the central bank. Given the objectives of the central bank, the central 
bank aggregates all of the balance sheets of the banks in the economy and sets up the optimal 
distribution between regulatory part of the balance sheet and the interest rate bearing part of 
the aggregated balance sheet. The central bank wants the balance sheet of the banks to evolve 
over time according to the following model:  
 
19. 
11
*
  tttt qxAt    
 
Where A* is the size of the balance sheet of all of the banks, x is the interest rate part and q is 
the regulation part. The parameters α and β represent the rates of change of each part of the 
balance sheet in each time period. The central bank controls the change in structure of x and q 
over time.  
Given the current state and the future expected states of the regulation the bank wants to be as 
close to the optimal distribution of x and q as possible. The problem the bank is trying to 
solve in that case is:  
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What the bank wants is to minimize the covariance between the optimal structure x* and q* 
of the balance sheet and the actual structure x and q of the balance sheet. Since q and x are 
tied together the bank can either try to maximize x or minimize q, we are going to model the 
problem of the minimization of q part of the balance sheet. The minimization is subject to  
 
21.  
 tttt
q
1
'        
 
The bank is trying to minimize the variance between the regulation and the actual structure of 
the balance sheet. Where λt׀t-1 and Ξ are r×1 vectors which contain the bank’s model of 
prediction of the changes in the regulation. The bank’s model is not the “true model” used by 
the central bank and the bank does not know the true model. The parameter σ is the vector of 
random i.i.d. disturbances.  
In the minimization problem we have E, this E denotes expectations, which are created 
rationally, but based on the wrong model. The parameter λ also has the subscript t conditional 
on t-1, this means that the bank every time period collects the current set of regulation and 
then updates its knowledge about the changes in the regulation. This means the model the 
bank is using is getting better and better with each time period. The bank will update its 
“wrong” model in each time period:  
 
22.   tttq '   
23.  1tt    
 
Where Ω is not correlated with σ and is an i.i.d. Gaussian random vector with mean zero and 
some covariance matrix K. The mean estimate of the model is going to be  
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If we let  
26. )( 11   ttt VarQ      
 
Given the bank’s model the mean estimates are optimally updated via the Kalman filter. 
Given the values of 
01
ˆ  and 
1tt
Q  the Kalman filter algorithm updates 
1
ˆ
tt
  with the 
following formula 
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The learning process from the Kalman filter
12
 is eventually going to converge to the correct 
model of the central bank. The desired distribution of the bank’s balance sheet is going to be 
achieved as the banks learn the true model. The model presented here refers to the structure of 
the balance sheet given the distribution of the regulation and the non-regulation parts of the 
balance sheet. We have confronted the bank with the central bank and have not juxtaposed 
bank and other participants in the economy.  
In the model presented here we have allowed banks to learn the process of regulation and 
optimize their behavior depending on the regulatory regime the central bank is imposing. 
Since the banks do not know the exact model of the central bank, they have to learn the model 
over time. The fact the banks do not know the model is the source of uncertainty in the model 
and in the financial system in general.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This paper presents banks as economic participants which are faced with two dynamic 
problems. The first dynamic problem is how to optimize their balance sheet in order to 
maximize their profits. The second problem the banks are faced is how to optimize their 
behavior when faced with the inferior position with the central bank which dictates monetary 
policy and through regulation and the nature and structure of regulation directly dictates the 
structure of the bank’s balance sheet. The shocks to the balance sheet are stochastic and hard 
to predict. Since the bank is faced with two exogenous sets of shocks the market interest rates 
and the regulation imposed by the central bank the bank has a hard problem to optimize the 
business side.  
This paper provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of a dual problem in banking. 
What this framework provides is the theoretical model for the analysis off banking strategies. 
The model shows that there is a strong impact of regulation and that the bank transfers the 
regulatory structure onto the structure of the interest bearing assets. The model in this paper 
directly implies there is an impact of regulation on bank’s credit policy and sector distribution 
of credit in the economy.  
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